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ABSTRACT
Machine learning models leak information about the datasets on
which they are trained. An adversary can build an algorithm to
trace the individual members of a model’s training dataset. As a
fundamental inference attack, he aims to distinguish between data
points that were part of themodel’s training set and any other data
points from the same distribution. This is known as the tracing
(and also membership inference) attack. In this paper, we focus on
such attacks against black-box models, where the adversary can
only observe the output of themodel, but not its parameters. This is
the current setting of machine learning as a service in the Internet.
We introduce a privacy mechanism to train machine learning
models that provably achieve membership privacy: the model’s
predictions on its training data are indistinguishable from its pre-
dictions on other data points from the same distribution. We de-
sign a strategic mechanism where the privacy mechanism antici-
pates the membership inference attacks. The objective is to train
a model such that not only does it have the minimum prediction
error (high utility), but also it is the most robust model against its
corresponding strongest inference attack (high privacy). We for-
malize this as a min-max game optimization problem, and design
an adversarial training algorithm that minimizes the classification
loss of the model as well as the maximum gain of the membership
inference attack against it. This strategy, which guarantees mem-
bership privacy (as prediction indistinguishability), acts also as a
strong regularizer and significantly generalizes the model.
We evaluate our privacy mechanism on deep neural networks
using different benchmark datasets. We show that our min-max
strategy can mitigate the risk of membership inference attacks
(close to the random guess) with a negligible cost in terms of the
classification error.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Large available datasets and powerful computing infrastructures,
as well as advances in training complex machine learning mod-
els, have dramatically increased the adoption of machine learning
in software systems. Many algorithms, applications, and services
that used to be built based on expert knowledge, now can be de-
signed using much less engineering effort by relying on advanced
machine learning algorithms. Machine learning itself has also been
provided as a service, to facilitate the use of this technology by sys-
tem designers and application developers. Data holders can train
models using machine learning as a service (MLaaS) platforms (by
Google, Amazon, Microsoft, ...) and share them with others or use
them in their own applications. The models are accessible through
prediction APIs, which allow simple integration of machine learn-
ing algorithms into applications in the Internet.
Awide range of sensitive data, such as online and offline profiles
of users, location traces, personal photos, speech samples, medical
and clinical records, and financial portfolios, is used as input for
training machine learning models. The confidentiality and privacy
of such data is of utmost importance to data holders. Even if the
training platform is trusted (e.g., using confidential computing, or
by simply training the model on the data owner’s servers) the re-
maining concern is if a model’s computations (i.e., its predictions)
can be exploited to endanger privacy of its sensitive training data.
The data required for training accurate models presents seri-
ous privacy issues. The leakage through complex machine learn-
ing models maybe less obvious, compared to, for example, linear
statistics [18]. However, machine learning models, similar to other
types of computations, could significantly leak information about
the datasets on which they are computed. In particular, an adver-
sary, with even black-box access to a model, can perform a mem-
bership inference [23, 43] (also known as the tracing [17]) attack
against the model to determine whether or not a target data record
is a member of its training set [45]. The adversary exploits the dis-
tinctive statistical features of the model’s predictions on its train-
ing data. This is a fundamental threat to data privacy, and is shown
to be effective against various machine learning models and ser-
vices [45].
In this paper, we focus on protecting machine learning models
against this exact threat: black-box membership inference attacks.
There are two major groups of existing defense mechanisms. The
first group includes simple mitigation techniques, such as limit-
ing the model’s predictions to top-k classes, therefore reducing the
precision of predictions, or regularizing the model (e.g., using L2-
norm regularizers) [19, 45]. These techniques may impose a negli-
gible utility loss to the model. However, they cannot guarantee any
rigorous notion of privacy. The second major group of defenses
use differential privacy mechanisms [1, 6, 10, 40, 41]. These mech-
anisms do guarantee (membership) privacy up to their privacy pa-
rameter ϵ . However, the existing mechanisms may impose a sig-
nificant classification accuracy loss for protecting large models on
high dimensional data for small values of ϵ . This comes from not
explicitly including utility into the design objective of the privacy
mechanism. Also, it is because the differential privacymechanisms
are designed so as to guarantee input indistinguishability for all
possible input training datasets (that differ in a constant number
of records), and for all possible parameters/outputs of the models.
Whereas, we explicitly include utility in the objective of the pri-
vacy mechanism which protects the very existing training dataset.
1
Contributions. In this paper, we design a rigorous privacy
mechanism for protecting a given training dataset, against a par-
ticular adversarial objective. We want to train machine learning
models that guarantee membership privacy: No adversary can
distinguish between the predictions of the model on its training
set from the model’s prediction on other data samples from the
same underlying distribution, up to the privacy parameter. This
is a more targeted privacy notion than differential privacy, as we
aim at a very specific (prediction) indistinguishability guarantee.
Our objective is that the privacy-preserving model should achieve
membership privacy with the minimum classification loss.
We formalize membership inference attacks and define the de-
fender’s objective for achieving membership privacy for classifica-
tion models. Based on these definitions, we design an optimiza-
tion problem to minimize the classification error of the model
and the inference accuracy of the strongest attack who adaptively
maximizes his gain. Therefore, this problem optimizes a compo-
sition of two conflicting objectives. We model this optimization
as a min-max privacy game between the defense mechanism
and the inference attack, similar to privacy games in other set-
tings [2, 24, 27, 34, 46]. The solution is a model which not only
is accurate but also has the maximummembership privacy against
its corresponding strongest inference attack. The adversary cannot
design a better inference attack thanwhat is already anticipated by
the defender; therefore, membership privacy is guaranteed. There
does not also exist any model that, for the same level of member-
ship privacy, can give a better accuracy. So, maximum utility (for
the same level of privacy) is also guaranteed.
To find the solution to our optimization problem, we train the
model in an adversarial process. The classification model maps
features of a data record to classes, and computes the probability
that it belongs to any class. The primary objective of this model
is to minimize prediction error. The inference model maps a tar-
get data record, and the output of the classifier on it, to its mem-
bership probability. The objective of the inference model is to
maximize its membership inference accuracy. To protect data pri-
vacy, we add the gain of the inference attack as a regularizer for
the classifier. Using a regularization parameter, we can control
the trade-off between membership privacy and classification er-
ror. We train the models in a similar way as generative adversarial
networks [21] and other adversarial processes for machine learn-
ing [11, 14, 29, 35, 36, 38]. Our training algorithm can converge
to an equilibrium point where the best membership inference at-
tack against it is random guess, and this is achieved with minimum
classification accuracy loss.
We present the experimental results on deep neural networks
using benchmark ML datasets as well as the datasets used in the
ML privacy literature. We compute various statistics of models’
predictions on their training and test sets, in order to illustrate
the worst case and the average case gaps between these statistics
(which cause the privacy risk). The gaps are reduced by several or-
ders of magnitude when the model is trained using our min-max
privacy mechanism, compared to non-privacy-preserving models.
Our results verify our theoretical analysis that we impose only
a negligible loss in classification accuracy for a significant
gain in membership privacy. For the CIFAR100 dataset trained
with Alexnet and Densenet architectures, the cost is respectively
1.1% and 3% drop in the prediction accuracy, relative to the regular
non-privacy-preserving models. For the Purchase100 and Texas100
datasets (used in [45]), the cost of membership privacy in terms of
classification accuracy drop is 3.6% and 4.4%, respectively, for re-
ducing the inference accuracy from 67.6% to 51.6% and from 63% to
51%, respectively. Note that the membership privacy is maximum
when the membership inference accuracy is 50% (random guess).
We also show that our mechanism strongly regularizes the
models, by significantly closing the gap between their training
and testing accuracy, and preventing overfitting. This directly
follows from the indistinguishability of our privacy-preserving
model’s prediction distributions on training versus test data. For
example, on the Purchase100 dataset, we can obtain 76.5% testing
accuracy for 51.8% membership inference accuracy. In contrast, a
standard L2-norm regularizer may provide a similar level of pri-
vacy (against the same attack) but with a 32.1% classification accu-
racy.
2 MACHINE LEARNING
In this paper, we focus on training classification models using su-
pervised learning. Table 1 summarizes the notations and formally
states the objective function of the classifier. Let X be the set of
all possible data points in a d-dimensional space, where each di-
mension represents one attribute of a data point (and will be used
as the input features in the classification model). We assume there
is a predefined set of k classes for data points in X . The objective
is to find the relation between each data point and the classes as a
classification function f : X −→ Y . The output reflects how f clas-
sifies each input into different classes. Each element of an output
y ∈ Y is a score vector that shows the relative association of any
input to different classes. All elements of a vector y are in range
[0, 1], and are normalized such that they sum up to 1, so they are
interpreted as the probabilities that the input belongs to different
classes.
Let Pr(X,Y) represent the underlying probability distribution of
all data points in the universe X × Y , where X and Y are random
variables for the features and the classes of data points, respec-
tively. The objective of a machine learning algorithm is to find a
classification model f that accurately represents this distribution
and maps each point in X to its correct class in Y . We assume we
have a lower-bounded real-valued loss function l(f (x),y) that, for
each data point (x,y), measures the difference between y and the
model’s prediction f (x). The machine learning objective is to find
a function f that minimizes the expected loss:
L(f ) = E
(x,y)∼Pr(X,Y)
[l(f (x),y)] (1)
We can estimate the probability function Pr(X,Y) using samples
drawn from it. These samples construct the training set D ⊂ X ×Y .
Instead of minimizing (1), machine learning algorithms minimize
the expected empirical loss of the model over its training set D.
LD (f ) =
1
|D |
∑
(x,y)∈D
l(f (x),y) (2)
2
Classification model f : X −→ Y
Loss L(f ) = E
(x,y)∼Pr(X,Y)
[l(f (x),y)] =
∫
X×Y
l(f (x),y)Pr(X,Y)dx dy
Empirical loss LD (f ) =
1
|D |
∑
(x,y)∈D
l(f (x),y)
Optimization problem min
f
LD (f ) + λ R(f )
Table 1: Definition, loss, and optimization problem for the classification model f , where x ∈ X is a data point, y ∈ Y is a
classification vector, D is the model’s training set, l() is a loss function, R() is a regularizer, and λ is the regularization factor.
Inference model h : X × Y 2 −→ [0, 1]
Gain Gf (h) = E
(x,y)∼PrD (X,Y)
[loд(h(x,y, f (x)))] + E
(x,y)∼Pr\D (X,Y)
[log(1 − h(x,y, f (x)))]
Empirical gain Gf ,DA,D′A(h) =
1
2 |DA |
∑
(x,y)∈DA log(h(x,y, f (x))) +
1
2 |D′A |
∑
(x ′,y′)∈D′A log(1 − h(x
′
,y′, f (x ′)))
Optimization problem max
h
Gf ,DA,D′A(h)
Table 2: Definition, gain, and optimization problem for the membership inference aack h, where f is the target classifier,
PrD (X,Y) and Pr\D (X,Y) are the conditional probability distributions of data points in the target training set D and outside
it, respectively. The adversary’s background knowledge is composed of datasets DA (a subset of the training set D) and D′A
(samples drawn from Pr(X,Y) which are outside D). See Figure 1 for the illustration of the relation between h and f .
We can now state the optimization problem of learning a classi-
fication model as the following:
min
f
LD (f ) + λ R(f ) (3)
where R(f ) is a regularization function.
The function R(f ) is designed to prevent themodel from overfit-
ting to its training dataset [7]. For example, the regularization loss
(penalty) increases as the parameters of the function f grow arbi-
trarily large or co-adapt themselves to fit the particular dataset D
while minimizing LD (f ). If a model overfits, it obtains a small loss
on its training data, but fails to achieve a similar loss value on other
data points. By avoiding overfitting, models can generalize better
to all data samples drawn from Pr(X,Y). The regularization factor
λ controls the balance between the classification loss function and
the regularizer.
For solving the optimization problem (3), especially for non-
convex loss functions for complex models such as deep neural net-
works, the commonly used method is the stochastic gradient de-
scent algorithm [4, 52]. This is an iterative algorithmwhere in each
epoch of training, it selects a small subset (mini-batch) of the train-
ing data and updates the model (parameters) towards reducing the
loss over the mini-batch. After many epochs of training, the algo-
rithm converges to a local minimum of the loss function.
3 MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACK
The objective of membership inference attacks, also referred to as
tracing attacks, is to determine whether or not a target data record
is in a dataset, assuming that the attacker can observe a function
over the dataset (e.g., aggregate statistics, model).
Themembership inference attacks have mostly been studied for
analyzing data privacywith respect to simple statistical linear func-
tions [5, 17, 18, 23, 42, 43]. The attacker compares the released sta-
tistics from the dataset, and the same statistics computed on ran-
dom samples from the population, to see which one is closer to the
target data record. Alternatively, the adversary can compare the
target data record and samples from the population, to see which
one is closer to the released statistics. In either case, if the target
is closer to the released statistics, then there is a high chance that
it was a member of the dataset. The problem could be formulated
as a hypothesis test, and the adversary can make use of likelihood
ratio test to run the inference attack.
In the case of machine learning models, the membership infer-
ence attack is not as simple, especially in the black-box setting.
The adversary needs to distinguish training set members from
non-members from observing the model’s predictions, which are
3
features x label yinput
classifier f
prediction vector f (x)
inference model h
Pr((x,y) ∈ D) = h(x,y, f (x))
Figure 1: The relation between different elements of the
black-box classification model f and the inference model h.
indirect nonlinear computations on the training data. The exist-
ing inference algorithm suggests training another machine learn-
ing model, as the inference model, to find the statistical differ-
ences between predictions on members and predictions on non-
members [45]. In this section, we formally present this attack and
the optimization problem to model the adversary’s objective. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes the notations and the optimization problem. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the relation between different components of a
membership inference attack against machine learning models in
the black-box setting.
Let h be the inference model h : X × Y 2 −→ [0, 1]. For any data
point (x,y) and the model’s prediction vector f (x), it outputs the
probability of (x,y) being a member ofD (the training set of f ). Let
PrD (X,Y) and Pr\D (X,Y) be the conditional probabilities of (X,Y)
for samples in D and outside D, respectively. In an ideal setting
(of knowing these conditional probability distributions), the gain
function for the membership inference attack can be computed as
the following.
Gf (h) =
1
2
E
(x,y)∼PrD (X,Y)
[log(h(x,y, f (x)))]
+
1
2
E
(x,y)∼Pr\D (X,Y)
[log(1 − h(x,y, f (x)))]) (4)
The two expectations compute the correctness of the inference
model h when the target data record is sampled from the training
set, or from the rest of the universe. In a realistic setting, the proba-
bility distribution of data points in the universe and the probability
distribution over the members of the training setD are not directly
and accurately available to the adversary (for computing his gain).
Therefore, we compute the empirical gain of the inference model
on two disjoint datasetsDA and D′A , which are sampled according
to the probability distribution of the data points inside the train-
ing set and outside it, respectively. More concretely, the dataset
DA could be a subset of the target training set D, known to the
adversary. Given these sets, the empirical gain of the membership
classifier f
D D′
x x ′
inference model h
f (x ) f (x ′)
h(x, y, f (x )) h(x ′, y′, f (x ′))
Loss: l(f (x ), y)+
λ log(h(x, y, f (x )))
Gain: 12 log(h(x, y, f (x )))+
1
2 log(1 − h(x
′
, y′, f (x ′)))
Figure 2: Classification loss and inference gain, on the
training dataset D and reference dataset D′, in our
adversarial training. The classification loss is computed
over D, but, the inference gain is computed on both sets. To
simplicity the illustration, the mini-batch size is set to 1.
inference model is computed as the following.
Gf ,DA,D′A(h) =
1
2|DA |
∑
(x,y)∈DA
log(h(x,y, f (x)))
+
1
2|D′A |
∑
(x ′,y′)∈D′A
log(1 − h(x ′,y′, f (x ′))) (5)
Thus, the optimization problem for the membership inference
attack is simply maximizing this empirical gain.
max
h
Gf ,DA,D′A(h) (6)
The optimization problem needs to be solved on a given target
classification model f . However, it is shown that it can also be
trained on some shadow models, which have the same model type,
architecture, and objective function as themodel f , and are trained
on data records sampled from Pr(X,Y) [45].
4 MIN-MAX MEMBERSHIP PRIVACY GAME
The adversary always has the upper hand. He adapts his inference
attack to his target model in order to maximize his gain with re-
spect to this existing classification model. This means that a de-
fense mechanism will be eventually broken if it is designed with
respect to a particular attack, without anticipating and preparing
for the (strongest) attack against itself. The conflicting objectives
of the defender and the adversary can be modeled as a privacy
game [2, 24, 34, 46]. In our particular setting, while the adversary
tries to get the maximum inference gain, the defender needs to
find the classification model that not only minimizes its loss, but
also minimizes the adversary’s maximum gain. This is a min-max
game.
The privacy objective of the classification model is to minimize
its privacy loss with respect to the worst case (i.e., maximum infer-
ence gain) attack. It is easy to achieve this by simply making the
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Algorithm 1 The adversarial training algorithm for machine learning with membership privacy. This algorithm optimizes the min-max
objective function (7). Each epoch of training includes k steps of the maximization part of (7), to find the best inference attack model,
followed by one step of the minimization part of (7) to find the best defensive classification model against such attack model.
1: for number of the training epochs do
2: for k steps do
3: Randomly sample a mini-batch ofm training data points {(x1,y1), (x2,y2), · · · , (xm ,ym)} from the training set D.
4: Randomly sample a mini-batch ofm reference data points {(x ′1,y
′
1), (x
′
2,y
′
2), · · · , (x
′
m ,y
′
m )} from the reference set D
′.
5: Update the inference model h by ascending its stochastic gradients over its parameters ω:
∇ω
λ
2m
(
m∑
i=1
log(h(xi ,yi , f (xi ))) +
m∑
i=1
(
log(1 − h(x ′i ,y
′
i , f (x
′
i )))
))
6: end for
7: Randomly sample a fresh mini-batch ofm training data points {(x1,y1), (x2,y2), · · · , (xm ,ym)} from D.
8: Update the classification model f by descending its stochastic gradients over its parameters θ :
∇θ
1
m
m∑
i=1
(l(f (xi ),yi ) + λ log(h(xi ,yi , f (xi ))))
9: end for
output of the model independent of its input, at the cost of destroy-
ing the utility of the classifier. Thus, we update the training objec-
tive of the classification model as minimizing privacy loss with
respect to the strongest inference attack, withminimum classifica-
tion loss. This results in designing the optimal privacy mechanism
which is also utility maximizing.
We formalize the joint privacy and classification objectives in
the following min-max optimization problem.
min
f
©­­­­­­«
LD (f ) + λ max
h
Gf ,D,D′(h)︸              ︷︷              ︸
optimal inference
ª®®®®®®¬︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
optimal privacy-preserving classification
(7)
The inner maximization finds the strongest inference model h
against a given classification model f . The outer minimization
finds the strongest defensive classification model f against a given
h. The parameter λ controls the importance of optimizing classifi-
cation accuracy versus membership privacy. The inference attack
term which is multiplied by λ acts as a regularizer for the classifi-
cation model. In other words, it prevents the classification model
to arbitrarily adapt itself to its training data at the cost of leaking
information about the training data to the inference attack model.
Note that (7) is equivalent to (3), if we set R(f ) to (6).
These two optimizations need to be solved jointly to find the
equilibrium point. For arbitrarily complex functions f and h, this
game can be solved numerically using the stochastic gradient de-
scent algorithm (similar to the case of generative adversarial net-
works [21]). The training involves two datasets: the training set D,
whichwill be used to train the classifier, and a disjoint reference set
D′ that, similar to the training set, contains samples from Pr(X,Y).
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code of the adversarial train-
ing of the classifier f onD—against its best inference attack model
h. In each epoch of training, the two models f and h are alter-
natively trained to find their best responses against each other
through solving the nested optimizations in (7). In the inner opti-
mization step: for a fixed classifier f , the inference model is trained
to distinguish the predictions of f on its training setD from predic-
tions of the samemodel f on reference setD′. This step maximizes
the empirical inference gain Gf ,D,D′(h). In the outer optimization
step: for a fixed inference attack h, the classifier is trained on D,
with the adversary’s gain function acting as a regularizer. Thismin-
imizes the empirical classification loss LD (f ) + λGf ,D,D′(h). We
want this algorithm to converge to the equilibrium point of the
min-max game that solves (7).
Theoretical Analysis. Our ultimate objective is to train a clas-
sification model f such that it has indistinguishably similar output
distributions for data members of its training set versus the non-
members.Wemake use of the theoretical analysis of the generative
adversarial networks [21] to reason about how Algorithm 1 tries
to converge to such privacy-preserving model. For a given classifi-
cation model f , let pf be the probability distribution of its output
(i.e., prediction vector) on its training dataD, and letp ′
f
be the prob-
ability distribution of the output of f on any data points outside
the training dataset (i.e., X × Y \ D).
For a given classifier f , the optimal attackmodel maximizes (4),
which can be expanded to the following.
Gf (h) =
1
2
(
∫
x,y
PrD (x,y)pf (f (x)) log(h(x,y, f (x)))dxdy
+
∫
x ′,y′
Pr\D (x
′
,y′)p ′
f
(f (x ′)) log(1 − h(x ′,y′, f (x ′)))dx ′dy′)
(8)
The maximum value of Gf (h) is achievable by the optimal infer-
ence model h∗
f
with enough learning capacity, and is equal to
h∗f (x,y, f (x)) =
PrD (x,y)pf (f (x))
PrD (x,y)pf (f (x)) + Pr\D (x,y)p
′
f
(f (x))
(9)
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This combines what is already known (to the adversary) about
the distribution of data inside and outside the training set, and
what can be learned from the predictions of the model about its
training set. Given that the training set is sampled from the un-
derlying probability distribution Pr(X,Y), and assuming that the
underlying distribution of the training data is a-priori unknown to
the adversary, the optimal inference model is the following.
h∗f (x,y, f (x)) =
pf (f (x))
pf (f (x)) + p
′
f
(f (x))
(10)
This means that the best strategy of the adversary is to deter-
mine membership by comparing the probability that the prediction
f (x) comes from distribution pf or alternatively from p
′
f
.
Given the optimal strategy of adversary against any classifier,
we design the optimal classifier as the best response to the inference
attack. The privacy-preserving classification task has two objec-
tives (7): minimizing both the classification loss LD (f ) and the pri-
vacy loss Gf ,D,D′(h
∗
f
). In the state space of all classification mod-
els f that have the same classification loss LD (f ), the min-max
game (7) will be reduced to solving minf maxh Gf ,D,D′(h) which
is then computed as:
min
f
max
h
E
(x,y)∼PrD (X,Y)
[log(h(x,y, f (x)))]
+ E
(x,y)∼Pr\D (X,Y)
[log(1 − h(x,y, f (x)))] (11)
According to Theorem 1 in [21], the optimal function f ∗ is the
global minimization function if and only if pf ∗ = p
′
f ∗
. This means
that for a fixed classification loss and with enough learning ca-
pacity for model f , the training algorithm minimizes the privacy
loss by making the two distributionspf ∗ and p
′
f ∗
indistinguishable.
This implies that the optimal classifier pushes the membership in-
ference probability h∗
f
(x,y, f (x)) to converge to 0.5, i.e., random
guess. According to Proposition 2 in [21], we can prove that the
stochastic gradient descent algorithm of Algorithm 1 eventually
converges to the equilibrium of the min-max game (7). To sum-
marize, the solution will be a classification model with minimum
classification loss such that the strongest inference attack against
it cannot distinguish its training set members from non-members
by observing the model’s predictions on them.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we apply our method to several different classifi-
cation tasks using various neural network structures. We imple-
mented our method using Pytorch1. The purpose of this section
is to empirically show the robustness of our privacy-preserving
model against inference attacks and its negligible classification
loss.
5.1 Datasets
We use three datasets: a major machine learning benchmark
dataset (CIFAR100), and two datasets (Purchase100, Texas100)
which are used in the original membership inference attack against
machine learning models [45].
1http://pytorch.org/
CIFAR100. This is a major benchmark dataset used to evaluate
image recognition algorithms [30]. The dataset contains 60,000 im-
ages, each composed of 32 × 32 color pixels. The records are clus-
tered into 100 classes, where each class represents one object.
Purchase100. This dataset is based on Kaggle’s “acquire valued
shopper” challenge. 2 The dataset includes shopping records for
several thousand individuals. The goal of the challenge is to find
offer discounts to attract new shoppers to buy new products. Cour-
tesy of the authors [45], we obtained the processed and simpli-
fied version of this dataset. Each data record corresponds to one
costumer and has 600 binary features (each corresponding to one
item). Each feature reflects if the item is purchased by the costumer
or not. The data is clustered into 100 classes and the task is to pre-
dict the class for each costumer. The dataset contains 197,324 data
records.
Texas100. This dataset includes hospital discharge data. The
records in the dataset contain information about inpatient stays
in several health facilities published by the Texas Department of
State Health Services. Data records have features about the exter-
nal causes of injury (e.g., suicide, drug misuse), the diagnosis (e.g.,
schizophrenia, illegal abortion), the procedures the patient under-
went (e.g., surgery), and generic information such as gender, age,
race, hospital ID, and length of stay. Courtesy of the authors [45],
we obtained the processed dataset, which contains 67,330 records
and 6,170 binary features which represent the 100 most frequent
medical procedures. The records are clustered into 100 classes,
each representing a different type of patient.
5.2 Classification Models
For the CIFAR100 dataset, we used two different neural network
architectures. (1) Alexnet architecture [31], trained with Adam
optimizer[28] with learning rate 0.0001, and 100 epochs of training.
(2) DenseNet architecture [25], trained with stochastic gradient de-
scent (SGD) for 300 epochs, with learning rate 0.001 from epoch 0
to 100, 0.0001 from 100 to 200, and 0.00001 from 200 to 300. Follow-
ing their architectures, both these models are regularized. Alexnet
uses Dropout (0.2), and Densenet uses L2-norm regularization (5e-
4).
For the Purchase100 dataset, we used a 4-layer fully connected
neural networkwith layer sizes [1024, 512, 256, 100].We used Tanh
activation functions, similar to [45]. We initialized all of parame-
ters with a random normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation 0.01. We trained the model for 50 epochs.
For the Texas dataset, we used a 5-layer fully connected neural
network with layer sizes [2048, 1024, 512, 256, 100], with Tanh ac-
tivation functions. We initialized all of parameters with a random
normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.01. We
trained the model for 50 epochs.
Table 3 shows the number of training data as well as refer-
ence data samples which we used in our experiments for differ-
ent datasets. It also reports the adversarial regularization factor λ
which was used in our experiments.
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge/data
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f (x) y
100 × 1024
1024 × 512
512 × 64
100 × 512
512 × 64
256 × 64
128 × 256
64 × 1
h(x,y, f (x))
Figure 3: The neural network architecture for the inference
attackmodel. Each layer is fully connected to its subsequent
layer. The size of each fully connected layer is provided.
5.3 Inference Attack Model
For the inference model, we also make use of neural networks. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the architecture of our inference neural network.
The objective of the attack model is to compute the membership
probability of a target record (x,y) in the training set of the clas-
sification model f . The attack model inputs (x,y) as well as the
prediction vector of the classification model on it, i.e., f (x). We
design the inference attack model with three separate fully con-
nected sub-networks. One network of layer sizes [100,1024,512,64]
operates on the prediction vector f (x). One network of layer sizes
[100,512,64] operates on the label which is one-hot coded (all el-
ements are 0 except the one that corresponds to the label index).
The third (common) network operates on the concatenation of the
output of the first two networks and has layer sizes of [256,64,1]. In
contrast to [45] which trains k membership inference attack mod-
els (one per class), we design only a single model for the inference
attack. The architecture of our attack model, notably its last (com-
mon) layers, enables capturing the relation between the class and
the predictions of the model for training set members versus non-
members.
We use ReLu as the activation function in the network. All
weights are initialized with normal distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation 0.01, and all biases are initialized to 0. We use
Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.001. We make sure every
training batch for the attack model has the same number of mem-
ber and non-member instances to prevent the attack model to be
biased toward one side.
Table 3 shows the number of known members of the training
set, DA, and known non-member data points,D′A, that we assume
for the adversary, which is used for training his attack model. The
larger these sets are (especially theDA set), the more knowledge is
assumed for the attacker. As we are evaluating our defense mecha-
nism, we assume a strong adversary who knows a substantial frac-
tion of the training set and tries to infer the membership of the rest
of it.
Dataset |D | |D′ | λ |DA | |D′A |
Purchase100 20,000 20,000 3 5,000 20,000
Texas100 10,000 5,000 2 5,000 10,000
CIFAR100 50,000 5,000 6 25,000 5,000
Table 3: Experimental setup, including the size of the train-
ing set D and reference set D′ in Algorithm 1, the adversar-
ial regularization factor λ, as well as the size of the adver-
sary’s knownmembersDA of the classifier’s training set and
known non-members D′A.
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Figure 4: The trajectory of the classification loss during
training with/without defensemechanism, as well as the in-
ference attack gain, using the Purchase100 dataset.
5.4 Empirical Results
Loss and Gain of the Adversarial Training
Figure 4 shows the empirical loss of the classification model (2)
as well as the empirical gain of the inference model (5) through-
out the training using Algorithm (1). By observing both the clas-
sifier’s loss and the attack’s gain over the training epochs, we can
see that they converge to an equilibrium point. Following the opti-
mization problem (7), the attacker’s gain is the maximum that can
be achieved against the best defense mechanism. The classifier’s
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Without defense With defense
Dataset Training
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Training
accuracy
Testing
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Purchase100 100% 80.1% 67.6% 92.2% 76.5% 51.6%
Texas100 81.6% 51.9% 63% 55% 47.5% 51.0%
CIFAR100- Alexnet 99% 44.7% 53.2% 66.3% 43.6% 50.7%
CIFAR100- DenseNET 100% 70.6% 54.5% 80.3% 67.6% 51.0%
Table 4: Comparison of membership privacy and training/test accuracy of a classification model (without defense), and
a privacy-preserving model (with defense) on four different models/datasets. Compare the two cases with respect to the
trade-off between testing accuracy and attack accuracy. See Table 3 for the experimental setup.
λ Training Testing Attack
accuracy accuracy accuracy
0 (no defense) 100% 80.1% 67.6%
1 98.7% 78.3% 57.0%
2 96.7% 77.4% 55.0%
3 92.2% 76.5% 51.8%
10 76.3% 70.1% 50.6%
Table 5: The effect of the adversarial regularization factor
λ, used in the min-max optimization (7), which also acts as
our privacy parameter, on the defense mechanism trained
on the Purchase100 dataset.
L2-regularization Training Testing Attack
factor accuracy accuracy accuracy
0 (no regularization) 100% 80.1% 67.6%
0.001 86% 81.3% 60%
0.005 74% 70.2% 56%
0.01 34% 32.1% 50.6%
Table 6: The results of using a L2−regularization as a mitiga-
tion technique formembership inference attack. Themodel
is trainedon the Purchase100 dataset. Compare these results
with those in Table 4 which shows what we can achieve us-
ing the strategic min-max optimization.
Reference set size Testing accuracy Attack accuracy
1,000 80.0% 59.2%
5,000 77.4% 52.8%
10,000 76.8% 52.4%
20,000 76.5% 51.6%
30,000 76.4% 50.6%
Table 7: The effect of the size of the reference set D′ on the
defense mechanism for the Purchase100 dataset. Note that
(as also shown inTable 3) the size of the training set is 20,000.
loss is also the minimum that can be achieved while preserving
privacy against the best attack mechanism. As shown in Section 4,
by minimizing the classifier’s loss, we train a model that not only
prevents the attack’s gain to grow large, but also forces the adver-
sary to play the random guess strategy.
In Figure 4 (top), we compare the evolution of the classifica-
tion loss of the privacy-preserving model with the loss of the
same model when trained regularly (without defense). As we can
see, a regular model (without defense) arbitrarily reduces its loss,
thus might overfit to its training data. Later in this section, in Fig-
ure 6, we visualize the impact of this small loss on the output
of the model, and we show how this can leak information about
the model’s training set. The adversarial training for member-
ship privacy strongly regularizes the model. Thus, our privacy-
preserving mechanism not only protects membership privacy but
also significantly prevents overfitting.
Privacy and Generalization
To further study the tradeoff between privacy and predictive
power of privacy-preserving models, in Figure 5 we show the cu-
mulative distribution of the model’s generalization error over dif-
ferent classes. The plot shows the fraction of classes (y-axis) for
which themodel has a generalization error under a certain value (x-
axis). For each class, we compute the model’s generalization error
as the difference between the testing and training accuracy of the
model for samples from that class [22]. We compare the generaliza-
tion error of a regular model and our privacy-preserving model. As
the plots show, the generalization error of our privacy mechanism
is significantly lower over all the classes.
Table 4 presents all the results of training privacy-preserving
machine learning models using our min-max game, for all our
datasets. It also compares themwith the samemodelswhen trained
regularly (without defense). Note the gap between training and
testing accuracy with and without the defensive training. Our
mechanism reduces the total generalization error by a factor of
up to 4. For example, the error is reduced from 29.7% down to 7.5%
for the Texas100 model, it is reduced from 54.3% down to 22.7% for
the CIFAR100-Alexnet model, and it is reduced from 29.4% down to
12.7% for the CIFAR100-Densenet model, while it remains almost
the same for the Purchase100 model. Our min-max mechanism
achieves membership privacy with the minimum generaliza-
tion error.Table 5 shows howwe can control the trade-off between
prediction accuracy and privacy, by adjusting the adversarial reg-
ularization factor λ.
The regularization effect of our mechanism can be compared to
what can be achieved using common regularizers such as the L2-
norm regularizer, where R(fθ ) =
∑
i θ
2
i (see our formalization of a
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Figure 5: The empirical CDF of the generalization error of
classification models across different classes, for regular
models (without defense) versus privacy-preservingmodels
(with defense). We compute generalization error as the dif-
ference between the training and testing accuracy of the
model [22]. The y-axis is the fraction of classes that have
generalization error less than x-axis. The curves that lean
towards left have a smaller generalization error.
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Figure 6: The distribution of the output (prediction vector)
of the classifier on the training data samples from class
50 in the Purchase100 dataset. Each color represents one
data sample. Without the defense, all samples are classi-
fied into class 50 with a probability close to 1. Whereas, the
privacy-preserving classifier spreads the prediction proba-
bility across many classes. This added uncertainty is what
provably mitigates the information leakage. The figure at
the bottom is computed on the test data samples from class
50, which is indistinguishable from the middle figure.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the classifier’s prediction accuracy on members of its training set versus non-member data samples.
Accuracy is measured as the probability of predicting the right class for a sample input. The plots on the left show the distribu-
tion curves for regularmodels (without defense), and the ones on the right show the distribution curves for privacy-preserving
models (with defense). The larger the gap between the curves in a plot is, themore the information leakage of themodel about
its training set is. The privacy-preserving model reduces this gap by one to two orders of magnitude.
– Themaximum gap between the curves (with defense versus without defense) is as follows.
Purchase100 model: (0.02 vs. 0.34), Texas100 model: (0.05 vs. 0.25), and CIFAR100-Densenet model: (0.06 vs. 0.56).
– The average gap between the curves is as follows.
Purchase100 model: (0.007 vs. 0.013), Texas100 model: (0.004 vs. 0.016), and CIFAR100-Densenet model: (0.005 vs. 0.021).
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Figure 8: Distribution of the classifier’s prediction uncertainty on members of its training set versus non-member data points.
Uncertainty is measured as normalized Entropy of the model’s output (i.e., prediction vector). The plots on the left show
the distribution curves for regular models (without defense), and the ones on the right show the distribution curves for
privacy-preservingmodels (with defense). The larger the gap between the curves in a plot is, themore the information leakage
of the model about its training set is. The privacy-preserving model reduces this gap by one to two orders of magnitude.
– Themaximum gap between the curves (with defense versus without defense) is as follows.
Purchase100 model: (0.03 vs. 0.30), Texas100 model: (0.02 vs. 0.15), and CIFAR100-Densenet model: (0.04 vs. 0.49).
– The average gap between the curves is as follows.
Purchase100 model: (0.004 vs. 0.012), Texas100 model: (0.002 vs. 0.04), and CIFAR100-Densenet model: (0.002 vs. 0.01).
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classification loss function (3)). Table 6 shows the tradeoff between
the model’s test accuracy and membership privacy using L2-norm.
Such regularizers do not guarantee privacy nor they minimize the
cost of achieving it. For a close-to-maximumdegree ofmembership
privacy, the testing accuracy of our privacy-preserving mechanism
is more than twice the testing accuracy of a L2-norm regularized
model. This is exactly what we would expect from the optimiza-
tion objectives of our privacy-preserving model.
Membership Privacy and Inference Attack Accuracy
Table 4 presents the training and testing accuracy of the model,
as well as the attack accuracy. To measure the attack accuracy, we
evaluate the average probability that the inference attack model
correctly predicts the membership:∑
(x,y)∈D\DA
h(x,y, f (x)) +
∑
(x ′′,y′′)∈D′′
(1 − h(x ′′,y′′, f (x ′′)))
|D \ DA | + |D′′ |
where D′′ is a set of data points that are sampled from the same
underlying distribution as the training set, but does not overlap
with D nor with D′A.
The most important set of results in Table 4 is the two pairs of
colored columns which represent the testing accuracy of the clas-
sifier versus the attack accuracy. There is a tradeoff between the
predictive power of themodel and its robustness tomembership in-
ference attack. As expected from our theoretical results, the exper-
imental results show that the attack accuracy is much smaller (and
close to random guess) in the privacy-preserving model compared
to a regular model. Our privacy-preserving mechanism can
guarantee maximum achievable membership privacy with
only a negligible drop in the model’s predictive power. To
achieve a near maximummembership privacy, the testing accuracy
is dropped by 3.5% for the Purchase100 model, it is dropped by 4.4%
for the Texas100 model, it is dropped by 1.1% for the CIFAR100-
Alexnet model, and it is dropped by 3% for the CIFAR100-Densenet
model.
Effect of the Reference Set
The objective of our min-max optimization is to make the pre-
dictions of the model on its training data indistinguishable from
the model’s predictions on any sample from the underlying data
distribution. We make use of a set of samples from this distribu-
tion, named reference set, to empirically optimize the min-max ob-
jective. Table 7 shows the effect of the size of the reference set D′
on the model’s membership privacy. The models are trained on the
same training set D of size 20,000, and hyper-parameter λ = 3. As
expected, as the size of the reference set increases, it becomes bet-
ter at properly representing the underlying distribution, thus the
attack accuracy converges to 50%.
Indistinguishability of Predictions
The membership inference attacks against black-box models
exploit the statistical differences between the predictions of the
model on its members versus non-members. Figure 6 shows the
output of the model (i.e., the probability of being a sample from
each class) on its training data, for a regular model (without de-
fense) versus a privacy-preserving model. The input data are all
from class 50 in the Purchase100 dataset. The top figure illus-
trates that a regular model (which is overfitted on its training
set) produces a high probability for the correct class on its train-
ing data. This significantly contributes to the vulnerability of the
model to themembership inference attack. The privacy-preserving
model produces a visibly different distribution (the middle fig-
ure). Thismakes themembers’ outputs indistinguishable from non-
members’ outputs (the bottom figure). The min-max optimization
makes these two output distributions converge to indistinguish-
able distributions.
We further investigate the indistinguishability of these two dis-
tributions by computing some statistics (accuracy and uncertainty)
of the model’s output for different datasets. Figure 7 and Figure 8
show the results as the histogram of the models’ accuracy and un-
certainty over the training set and testing set. We compute the
accuracy of model f on data point (x,y) as fy (x), which is the
probability of predicting class y for input x . We compute uncer-
tainty as the normalized entropy −1log(k)
∑
i yˆi log(yˆi ) of the prob-
ability vector yˆ = f (x), where k is the number of classes. The
two figures show that our privacy mechanism significantly re-
duces both themaximum(worst case risk) and average gap be-
tween the prediction accuracy (and uncertainty) of the model
on its training versus test set, compared with a regular model.
Note that these figures do not prove privacy, but illustrate what
the attacker can exploit in his inference attacks. They visibly show
how the indistinguishability of the model’s output distributions
(on members and non-members) can improve by using our defense
mechanism.
6 RELATED WORK
Analyzing and protecting privacy in machine learning models
against different types of attacks is a topic of ongoing research.
A direct privacy threat against machine learning is the untrusted
access of the machine learning platform during training or predic-
tion. A number of defense mechanisms, which are based on trusted
hardware and cryptographic private computing, have been pro-
posed to enable blind training and use of machine learning models.
These methods leverage various techniques including homomor-
phic encryption, garbled circuits, and secure multi-party computa-
tion for private machine learning on encrypted data [8, 20, 33, 37],
as well as private computation using trusted hardware (e.g., Intel
SGX) [26, 39]. Although these techniques prevent an attacker from
directly observing the sensitive data, yet they do not limit informa-
tion leakage through the computation itself.
An adversary with some background knowledge and external
data can try to infer information such as the training data, the input
query, and the parameters of the model. These inference attacks
include input inference [19], membership inference [45], attribute
inference [9], parameter inference [47, 48], and side-channel at-
tacks [50]. There are examples of a wide-range of privacy attacks
against computations over sensitive data. Our focus is on the pri-
vacy risks of computation on databases, when the adversary ob-
serves the result of the computation. In such settings, membership
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inference attacks and reconstruction attacks are considered as the
two major classes of attacks [17].
Membership inference attack is a decisional problem. It aims
at inferring the presence of a target data record in the (training)
dataset [5, 18, 23, 42, 43, 45]. The accuracy of the attack shows the
extent to which a model is dependent on its individual training
data. The reconstruction attack is a more generic type of attack,
where the objective is to infer sensitive attributes of many individ-
uals in the training set [13, 49]. One proposed defense technique
against general inference attacks is computation (e.g., training of
models) with differential privacy guarantee [15, 16], which has re-
cently been used in the context ofmachine learning [1, 6, 10, 40, 41].
Despite their provable robustness against inference attacks, differ-
ential privacy mechanisms are hard to achieve with negligible util-
ity loss. The utility cost comes from the fact that we aim at protect-
ing privacy against all strong attacks by creating indistinguisha-
bility among similar states of all possible input datasets. It is also
related to the difficulty of computing a tight bound for the sensitiv-
ity of functions, which determines themagnitude of required noise
for differential privacy. The relation between some different defi-
nitions of membership privacy and differential privacy is analyzed
in the literature [32, 51].
Using game theory to formalize and optimize data privacy (and
security) is another direction for protecting privacy [2, 24, 34, 44,
46]. In such a framework, the privacy loss is minimized against the
strongest corresponding attack. The solution will be provably ro-
bust to any attack that threatens privacy according to such “loss”
function. The game-theoretic framework allows to explicitly incor-
porate the utility function into themin-max optimization, thus also
minimizing the cost of the privacy defense mechanism. The recent
advances in machine learning, notably the developments of gener-
ative adversarial networks [3, 12, 21], have introduced new algo-
rithms for solving min-max games while training a complex (deep
neural network) model. Adversarial training has also been used for
regularizing, hence generalizing, a model [11, 14, 29, 35, 36, 38].
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a new privacy mechanism for mitigating the
information leakage of the predictions of machine learning mod-
els about the membership of the data records in their training sets.
We design an optimization problem whose objective is to jointly
maximize privacy and prediction accuracy. We design a training
algorithm to solve a min-max game optimization that minimizes
the classification loss of the model while maximizing the gain of
the membership inference attack. The solution will be a model
whose predictions on its training data are indistinguishable from
its predictions on any data sample from the same underlying dis-
tribution. This mechanism guarantees membership privacy of the
model’s training set against the—strongest—inference attack, and
imposes the minimum accuracy loss for achieving such level of
privacy, given the available training/reference data and the ca-
pacity of the models. In our extensive experiments on applying
our method on benchmark machine learning tasks, we show that
the cost of achieving privacy is negligible, and that our privacy-
preserving models can generalize well.
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